北航经商院 • 经济学双周论坛 第十九期
“北航经商院 • 经济学双周论坛”将在本周迎来第十九期讨论，具体安排如下：
Title：Fickle for Survival: Bayesian Persuasion by a Strategic Regime
We study a regime change model where many citizens, who are imperfectly informed about the regime's strength, decide whether to participate in a revolt. The regime can commit to a strength-dependent information release policy of either truthfully announcing its strength or sending mixed messages, in order to maximize its ex-ante probability of survival. The game among citizens has a generically unique equilibrium, given their political stance between loyalist and revolutionist which determines the pattern of coordination. We also explicitly characterize the regime's optimal persuasion scheme. At optimum, the regime's tendency of being honest is higher when the regime is relatively more malicious, but is not necessarily so when it becomes stronger or when more citizens are revolutionists. When political stance is a choice, no citizen will choose to become a revolutionist even if doing so incurs only a small positive cost. In other words, even if under an evil autocratic regime, a little spark of resistance can hardly start a mighty flame of revolution among rational people.
赵墨非，首都经贸大学国际经管学院金融系助理教授，在UCLA获得经济学博士学位。主要研究方向为应用微观理论。具体研究问题为运用博弈论方法研究产业组织中的创新、竞争、企业决策等题目，也研究重复博弈、合作博弈和网络经济学。部分工作论文涉及政治经济学、金融、国际贸易等领域。论文发表在China Economic Review期刊等。
Dr. Mofei Zhao is Assistant Professor of Finance at International School of Economic Management in Capital University of Economics and Business. He earned his Ph.D. in economics from UCLA. His research focuses on the application of economic theory and game theory in industrial organization, public economics, and finance. His paper got published in international refereed journals such as China Economic Review.